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Abstract
A series of developments, both doctrinal and political, seem to signify a retreatfrom
earlierinnovations in the law and practiceof internationaljustice. On closer examination, however, recent developments in internationaljustice cannot be reduced to a
single trend line. Even as various actors and processes continue to work out the
ground rules for exercising jurisdiction in respect of human rights violations that
international law condemns as criminal, and as internationaland national courts
work through the inherently challengingproject of redressing mass atrocities,states
have increasingly internalized, owned and acted on the principle that they should
ensure accountabilitywhen theirofficials are legally responsiblefor atrociouscrimes.

1. Introduction
At the dawn of the 21st century the law and practice of global justice changed
with warp speed and seemed to herald a broader transformation of the architecture of global justice. The rapid succession of legal innovations remains astonishing today: in 1998, a diplomatic conference in Rome adopted a treaty to
establish a permanent international criminal court (ICC), which entered into
force in record time. In 1999, the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) indicted a sitting head of state and secured his transfer to The Hague for trial two years later; in 2003, the Special Court for Sierra
Leone (SCSL) indicted another head of state whom it, too, eventually brought
to trial. Meanwhile, in 1999, the United Nations (UN), whose envoys had long
encouraged warring factions to adopt blanket amnesties to advance an end to
conflict, adopted guidelines admonishing its agents to avoid amnesties that
foreclose prosecution of human rights crimes.
Perhaps no development more dramatically signalled a departure from
settled practice than the saga of former Chilean President Augusto Pinochet,
which at once seemed to validate a wider use for universal jurisdiction and, potentially, to be the leading edge of a 'further restriction of immunity ... in favor
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of human rights norms'.' Activating his country's broad law supporting universal jurisdiction, Spanish investigative judge Baltasar Garz6n upended
expectations when his pursuit of Pinochet on charges relating to human
rights violations in Chile while he was head of state led British authorities to
arrest Pinochet during a visit to London in 1998. More astonishing, in
PinochetIII the United Kingdom's (UK) highest court ruled that Garz6n's target
was not immune from criminal process in respect of certain charges relating
to torture in Chile. Lord Browne-Wilkinson captured the historic nature of
the ruling when he observed, 'if Senator Pinochet is not entitled to immunity ... it will be the first time ... when a local domestic court has refused to

afford immunity to a head of state or former head of state on the grounds that
there can be no immunity against prosecution for certain international
crimes'.2
Less clear, however, was the breadth of the judgment's doctrinal break with
past practice,3 whether the Spanish model of universal jurisdiction would
receive broader validation in the practice of states, and the degree to which
the ICC would emerge as a robust institution for combating impunity. The
past decade has begun to provide answers, though hardly in bright-line
terms. In myriad ways, recent years have tempered expectations about further
developments on the order of those seen at the turn of this century and highlighted the formidable challenges associated with doing justice for atrocious
crimes. Yet alongside these developments, others signify a deepening commitment to the notion that atrocious crimes must be punished.

2. The Unsettled Legacy of Pinochet III: Immunities
On the doctrinal front, a series of rulings have belied the most far-reaching
interpretations of Pinochet III, affirming the immunity of states, 4 and of certain
1 L.M. Caplan, 'State Immunity, Human Rights and Jus Cogens: A Critique of the Normative
Hierarchy Theory, 97 American Journalof InternationalLaw (2003) 741-781, at 744.
2 Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), [2000] 1 A.C.
147 (H.L. 24 March 1999) (hereafter 'Pinochet IIT), Opinion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson.
3 As has often been noted, Pinochet Ill is susceptible to several interpretations. On the widest
reading, the judgment held that violations of jus cogens norms cannot be considered official
acts shielded from the scrutiny of foreign courts. From this it might follow that, just as
Pinochet did not enjoy immunity ratione materiae from criminal proceedings for torture, violations of jus cogens norms cannot shield states themselves or their former officials from the
civil jurisdiction of foreign courts in respect of such violations. On the narrowest reading,
Pinochet III held only that the combined effect of the definition of torture in the Convention
against Torture, which requires official sanction, and that treaty's provision for mandatory universal criminal jurisdiction over torture was a withdrawal by states parties of the immunity
rationemateriae of their officials in criminal prosecutions for torture, and that the UK's domestic legislation did not alter this conclusion.
4 See e.g. JurisdictionalImmunities of the State (Germany v. Italy; Greece Intervening), Judgment of
3 February 2012, § 107; see also, Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom [GC], 21 November 2001, ECHR
Reports 2001-XI, § 61; 123 ILR 24 (holding that UK courts' dismissal of torture claim against
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incumbent officials in criminal proceedings, 5 despite the jus cogens nature of
the norms they were alleged to have breached. Perhaps most tellingly, in its
2006 judgment in Jones v. Ministry of Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
the UK House of Lords upheld not only the immunity of a foreign government
but also that of its former officials in a civil action for torture - the same
offence for which the law lords concluded Pinochet did not enjoy residual immunity in a criminal proceeding.6 There may be reasoned grounds to distinguish between civil and criminal actions against a former official of a foreign
government, at least in some contexts (for example, when interpreting a
national law or treaty that makes that distinction).7 Yet in a case involving
conduct that international law has condemned as criminal, it is difficult to
see a court justify its dismissal of a civil action on the ground that 'acts of
state officials acting in that capacity are not attributable to them personally
but only to the state',8 without recalling how decisively the Nuremberg tribunal dispatched this position,9 and wondering whether the distinction drawn
between civil and criminal actions in relation to this type of violation reflects a
principled difference. 10
But post-Pinochet decisions have not uniformly gone the same way as Jones.
In 2010, the United States (US) Supreme Court took much the opposite path in
Samantar v. Yousuf," which involved a civil lawsuit against a former Somali official accused of serious human rights violations. In a reversal of the dominant
approach taken by US courts for some two decades, the Supreme Court held
that the US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) does not apply to foreign

5
6
7

8
9

10

11

Kuwaiti government on grounds of its immunity did not violate the European Convention of
Human Rights).
Case Concerning the Arrest Warrantof11 April 2000 (DemocraticRepublic of the Congo v. Belgium),
Judgment of 14 February 2002.
Jones v. Ministry of Interiorof the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, [2006] UKHL 26, [20071 1 A.C. 270
(hereafter 'Jones') (appeal taken from England).
Indeed, several law lords invoked this distinction in Pinochet III to counter Pinochet's claims of
immunity from criminal process on the ground that he would enjoy immunity from a civil
suit for torture. See e.g. Pinochet III, Opinion of Lord Hutton, at 254, 264; Opinion of Lord
Millett, at 278; Opinion of Lord Phillips, at 280-281, 287.
Jones, Opinion of Lord Hoffman, § 66.
1 refer here to the following passage in the Nuremberg judgment:'The principle of International
Law, which under certain circumstances protects the representatives of a State, cannot be
applied to acts which are condemned as criminal by International Law. The authors of these
acts cannot shelter themselves behind their official position in order to be freed from punishment in appropriate proceedings.... He who violates the laws of war cannot obtain immunity
while acting in pursuance of the authority of the State if the State in authorizing action
moves outside its competence under International Law'.
Lord Hoffman seemed to recognize this anomaly in his opinion in Jones and addressed it by
characterizing the Convention against Torture as explicitly and narrowly withdrawing the
state immunity of former officials only for purposes of criminal proceedings on torture charges;
Jones, Opinion of Lord Hoffman, § 68.
Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. (2010). The Court left open the possibility of finding 'in some circumstances' that 'the immunity of the foreign state extends to an individual for acts taken in
his official capacity'.
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officials sued in their personal capacity, and thus does not shield them from the
immunity of US courts. Notably, this judicial turnaround was supported by
the US State Department, partly in recognition that 'changes in international
human rights norms ... have given rise to new views about the boundaries of
official action appropriately subject to immunity'.12 At a subsequent stage in
Samantar where immunities outside the framework of the FSIA were at issue,
the US Fourth Circuit Court found that 'under international and domestic law,
officials from other countries are not entitled to foreign official immunity for
jus cogens violations, even if the acts were performed in the defendant's official
capacity'.
In sum, if several rulings have belied the most far-reaching interpretations
of Pinochet III, courts have hardly taken a uniform approach in respect of the
immunities of former foreign officials in cases alleging their responsibility for
gross violations of human rights. As several courts have noted, the law in this
area remains in flux.

3. Amnesties and Universal Jurisdiction
Similarly contradictory trends can be seen in recent developments relating to
the UN guidelines for peace negotiators that eschew UN endorsed amnesties
for the most serious human rights violations. Although this aspect of the
guidelines has been reaffirmed since 1999, when they were first adopted, a
controversial Security Council resolution on Yemen adopted in 2011 endorsed
an initiative that promised a blanket amnesty for the country's then leader in
exchange for his stepping down - even while condemning human rights violations attributed to his government and stressing 'that all those responsible
for violence, human rights violations and abuses should be held accountable'.14
Meanwhile, several specific attempts to exercise universal jurisdiction
have provoked strong blowback, both from states unwilling to abide foreign
prosecutions of their former officials and possessing the power to induce
other states to curb their jurisdictional laws,15 and from African states that
saw European attempts to prosecute their officials as a neocolonial judicial
project. Tensions stemming from what the African Union (AU) saw as the
'abuse of universal jurisdiction' by Western states - exemplified above all by a
French judge's 2006 issuance of arrest warrants against nine Rwandan officials
12 Legal Adviser United States Department of State H.H. Koh, 'Foreign Official Immunity After
Samantar: A United States Government Perspective', 44 Vanderbilt Journal of TransnationalLaw
(2011) 1141-1161, at 1151.
13 Yousuf v. Samantar(4th Cir. 2012), No. 11-1479, Slip. Op. Nov. 2, 2012, at 21-22.
14 SC Res. 2014 (2011), operative § 2.
15 See R. Brody,'The world needs Spain's Universal Jurisdiction Law, 27 May 2009, available online
at www.hrw.org/news/2009/05/27/world-needs-spain-s-universal-jurisdiction-law (visited 29
April 2013). While amendments to Spain's law set some limits on when and how its courts
could exercise universal jurisdiction, amendments have also actually expanded the roster of
crimes for which universal jurisdiction could be exercised in Spain, adding new universal jurisdiction offences of female genital mutilation and human trafficking.
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and a Spanish judge's indictment of 40 Rwandan army officers in 2008 prompted initial discussions about adding criminal jurisdiction to the
African Court, an effort many now see as an attempt to sideline the ICC.
Significantly, however, these tensions have not produced a wholesale rejection
of universal jurisdiction but instead have prompted efforts to define the appropriate boundaries of its use.16

4. The ICC and Africa
Tensions between the AU and ICC similar to those triggered by several
European efforts to prosecute Rwandan officials brought one of the most serious challenges the fledgling Court had to confront during its formative years.
Where the ICTY and SCSL earned institutional strength by successfully bringing former leaders to trial, the ICC suffered a debilitating backlash when it
issued an arrest warrant against Sudanese President Omar al Bashir, who remains in office and free from arrest four years later. As is well known, in
2010, the AU called on member states not to cooperate in the arrest of al
Bashir,17 and the next year endorsed Kenya's bid for a Security Council deferral
of the ICC's Kenya investigation.18 Nor was it just the AU that took issue with
the fledgling Court's action: others decried what they saw as the destabilizing
impact of the Bashir arrest warrant,19 and other ICC actions.
More recently, Kenyans elected a president and deputy president who face
charges before the Court; ominously, the President of Uganda, a Rome Statute
state party that had 'self-referred'a situation to the ICC, used the occasion to denounce the 'arrogant actors' from the Court who carried out 'careless and shallow analysis'. 20 Meanwhile, the Court's strongest backers have been frustrated
by its slow pace and glaring weaknesses in some of its early prosecutions;
after all, it took a decade for the Court to complete its first trial (which was
16 For example, the previously-noted tensions produced by certain European cases against African
officials led the EU and the AU to collaborate in a joint effort to develop principles governing
the appropriate use of universal jurisdiction. In some respects a recent decision by the US
Supreme Court represents a more significant retreat from the use of universal jurisdiction,
albeit in the particular context of civil actions brought in US courts. On 17 April 2013, the
Court held that the Alien Tort Statute, which had for many years provided jurisdiction in suits
by non-US citizens against foreign defendants for human rights violations that occurred outside the United States, does not generally apply to conduct outside the United States. Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum, Co., 185 L. Ed. 2d 671 (2013).
17 Assembly of the AU. Assembly/AU/Dec.296 (XV), Kampala, 27 July 2010, §§5, 8, 9.
18 The AU supported a more recent initiative to have the ICC's Kenya cases sent back to Kenya at
the organization's May 2013 summit. See African Union seeks deferral of Kenyan ICC cases,
BBC Monitoring Africa, 28 May 2013.
19 See e.g. J. Flint and A. de Waal, 'To put justice before peace spells disaster for Sudan, The
Guardian,5 March 2009.
20 Uganda's President also congratulated Kenyan voters for rejecting 'the blackmail by the court
and those who seek to abuse this institution for their own agenda'; see J. Hatcher, 'Museveni
rails against the ICC during Kenyatta's inauguration, Mail & Guardian,12 April 2013.

522

JICJ 11 (2013), 517-526

almost dismissed twice), and the only other trial to reach judgment ended in
acquittal.
Yet, as with other developments that seem to signify setbacks for global justice, the challenges the ICC has faced in its early years are hardly the whole picture. Tensions between the first ICC prosecutor and the AU never translated
into wholesale African opposition to the Court. Some African states have consistently declined to heed AU calls for non-cooperation with the ICC, refusing
for example to allow al Bashir to visit their countries, and African states have
continued to accede to the Rome Statute. Moreover, with the departure of the
ICC's first prosecutor, who had a fractious relationship with the AU, and the
appointment of his successor, whose candidacy was endorsed by the AU, relations between the two institutions have improved.21 In another indication of
the Court's complex relations with African states, a sub-regional organization
in West Africa called for ICC action in Mali, 22 as did the African Commission
on Human and Peoples' Rights.
Notably, as well, AU protests against Western states' 'abuse of universal jurisdiction' and aspects of the ICC's work have not been framed as a challenge to
the core principles on which the Court was founded. Thus, for example, work
on a protocol to add criminal jurisdiction to the African Court, far from implicitly rejecting those principles, instead would enlarge regional capacity to
reckon with international crimes. In a similar vein, regional apprehensions
about the implications of Belgium's bid to prosecute former Chadian dictator
Hissine Habr6 did not translate into a rejection of international cooperation
to ensure justice for Habrd's alleged crimes, but instead produced a new. AU
led innovation in the repertoire of global justice - the establishment of a
court in Senegal where Habre is to be tried by African judges with financial
support from European countries and the AU. To the extent, moreover, that
the ICC's inability to secure custody of al Bashir has highlighted institutional
weakness, its success in gaining custody of former Ivoirian leader Laurent
Gbagbo marked a significant milestone.2 3

5. Bringing Justice Home
Although I have focused so far on two models many associate with international justice - universal and international jurisdiction - to my mind a
more meaningful mark of progress is the degree to which international justice's
core commitment to redress for atrocities has been taken up and practiced in
the countries where such crimes occurred. By this measure, there are
21 There has also been a succession in AU leadership, bringing in a new head of the AU
Commission who appears to be more supportive of the ICC than her predecessor. Still, the
chairman of the AU criticized the ICC at the organization's May 2013 summit. See A. Laing,
'International Criminal Court Accused of "hunting Africans"', The Daily Telegraph, 28 May 2013.
22 See 'ECOWAS Call on ICC over "War Crimes" in Mali', AlJazeera, 7 July 2012.
23 'Ivory Coast ex-President Laurent Gbagbo at ICC court, BBC News, 19 February 2013.
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significant signs of change. A study published in 2009 found that no fewer
than 67 former leaders were called to account in criminal proceedings between 1990 and 2008, about half on human rights charges and mostly in domestic courts.24 If this study were updated, it would include more recent
examples; as this essay was drafted, courts in Guatemala and Haiti had
recently summoned former leaders of their countries to answer for human
rights violations. 25
More and more countries now own the notion that they must ensure justice for grave violations of human rights - a more meaningful measure of
the success of global justice than the number of trials held before international and foreign courts. Not incidentally, in many countries the prospect of international and universal jurisdiction has helped widen the space
for accountability at home through processes of transitional justice, in a dynamic synergy of international, transnational and domestic judicial process.
To be sure, in the domestic realm as in others, efforts to establish justice for
past atrocities can be fraught with risks and challenges, as Egypt's prosecution
of former President Hosni Mubarak and Bangladesh's war crimes prosecutionS26 remind us. These challenges point to the need to mine past practice
for best practices but should not obscure the degree to states have taken
up and domesticated the principles of accountability that underwrite international justice.

6. Challenges that are Specific to International
Criminal Jurisdiction
However challenging state courts may find the practice of transitional justice,
several fundamental features of the ICC make its task infinitely harder. First,
the combined effect of the Court's finite capacity and global audience makes
each selection of a situation a political minefield for the Court. Why has the
Prosecutor opened investigations only in African countries? Why has the Security
Council referred the situation in Libya but not in Syria? If a particular country
selection seems legitimate to one segment of the global public, there is an
excellent chance that the same choice will bring forth cries of indignation
from another - or at least calls for 'balancing out' that selection by targeting
another country from a different region or bloc.
Within each situation taken up by the ICC, the challenge of selection
takes another form. Why these suspects and not those? The Prosecutor's general
practice has been to prosecute a tiny handful of suspects in each situation
24 E.L. Lutz and C. Reiger (eds), ProsecutingHeads of State (Cambridge University Press, 2009).
25 E. Malkin, 'Ex-Dictator Is Ordered to Trial in Guatemalan War Crimes Case, New York Times,
29 January 2013; I. Doucet and R.C. Archibold, 'Haitian Ex-Dictator Is Questioned in Court
over Reign, New York Times, 1 March 2013.
26 J.A. Manik andJ.YardleyAt Least 19 Are Killed as Unrest Persists in Bangladesh, New YorkTimes,
4 March 2013.
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the Court takes on, magnifying the significance of each decision to seek
charges as well as the consequences of any acquittal. With such a small
number of suspects in each situation, the acquittal of one or more can reverberate in ways that are far more consequential than is typically the case in
a domestic setting. Experience with the ICTY, which has operated twice as
long as the ICC, is instructive. The ICTY Appeals Chamber's November 2012
acquittal of two Croat suspects, Ante Gotovina and Mladen Marka6, for
crimes against Serb victims has been seen even among the ICTY's most
stalwart supporters as disastrous for the legacy of the Tribunal in Serbia. One
Serb lawyer described the impact of this verdict: 'The pervasive sense of
failure of justice was shared, as rarely ever, across the whole Serbian society'.
In his assessment, the damage to the Tribunal's legacy in Serbia 'is
irreparable'.27
The ICC's highly selective judicial interventions raise a question that goes to
the heart of its work and has a significant bearing on how it will be judged.
What is the theory of the case for extremely finite prosecutions by an international court? In the context of domestic prosecutions, leading experts in transitional justice have emphasized the risks associated with efforts to combat
pervasive impunity that place excessive emphasis on prosecutions and fail to
embed trials in a comprehensive project of justice and reform. 28 Conversely,
recent studies suggest that human rights trials are most likely to contribute
to a country's improved human rights record when undertaken in conjunction
with other measures of transitional justice, such as truth commissions, reparations and institutional reform. These studies show why we might expect to
see a very limited contributions flow from ICC cases unless the Court's work is
complemented by other measures - ones that, with the exception of reparations, are or have been thought to be largely beyond the province of the
Court itself.
And yet, if experience is a guide to the future, some countries will need the
ICC to play an important (if never sufficient) role in ending the impunity that
has devastated their societies. Here, the theory of the case for ICC engagement
might go something like this. In some situations, a country's attempt to prosecute the masterminds of mass atrocities would be destabilizing, yet their
impunity would be equally injurious and impede national reconstruction. The
ICC can help relieve such fragile states of the twin burdens of destabilizing
prosecutions and toxic impunity. But we doonm the ICC to failure if we burden
it with the expectation that its role, however important, is all that is needed
to ensure that a country ravaged by violence turns the proverbial corner and
remains securely on a path to social repair.

27 E-mail from Ivan Jovanovi6, 10 February 2013. From 2003 to 2012, Mr Jovanovi6 led the programme of support to war crimes trials in Serbia of the Organization for Support and
Co-operation in Europe.
28 See e.g. Report of the Special Rapporteuron the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence, Pablo de Greiff, UN Doc. A/HRC/21/46, 9 August 2012.
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Going forward, then, a major focus of efforts to bolster the Court should be
complementary and robust initiatives to strengthen domestic capacity and
commitments. For example, just as the ICTY worked closely with Bosnian
authorities and other international actors to help establish a credible domestic judicial partner in Sarajevo, 29 more robust efforts should be developed
by the ICC and its partners to ensure that its work is a catalyst for broader
efforts to prevent a recurrence of violence and not a substitute for domestic
reform.
Other challenges, however, fall squarely within the province of the ICC and
its supporters. Worries about the length (and consequent costs) of the Court's
trials are legitimate. At the same time, there are troubling indications that the
ICC's Kenya cases may have stumbled in part because, in an effort to avoid
unnecessary costs as well as minimize those at risk, the first prosecutor
placed unwise weight on too few witnesses. One important step that should
be taken to ensure the ICC has the resources it needs is to end the Security
Council's practice of referring situations to the Court while insisting that no
UN funds be used toward carrying out the new responsibilities it has just
placed on the Court.3 0
But the ICC must also do its part to streamline cumbersome proceedings.
Lessons from the Balkans, Rwanda and Cambodia suggest that the legitimacy
of the Court may in fact turn, at least in part, on its ability to do so. It has
often been noted that the ICTY has significantly different constituencies,
ranging from international lawyers to victims. Yet one criticism unites all of
these audiences: the ICTY's trials take too long. The approaching end of the
ICTY's work has spawned a rich literature assessing its legacy, which includes
reflections by former judges and practitioners before the Tribunal exploring
lessons learned about how its procedures could have been more efficient
without cheating justice. The ICC's judges and other participants in its work
would do well to mine and apply these authors' valuable insights with a view
to avoiding the same mistakes.

7. Conclusion
To come finally, then, to the question that frames this symposium issue.
Do recent developments signify a retreat from the global project of justice for
atrocious crimes? I would instead say that states have continued to work
through the basic ground rules governing the allocation of jurisdiction to provide redress for atrocious crimes and that earlier, unduly high, expectations
29 See D. Orentlicher, That Someone Guilty Be Punished: The Impact of the ICTY in Bosnia (Open
Society Justice Initiative and International Center for Transitional Justice, 2010), at Ch. VI.
30 See e.g. SC Res. 1970, operative § 8, recognizing 'that none of the expenses incurred in
connection with the referral, including expenses related to investigations or prosecutions in
connection with that referral, shall be borne by the United Nations and that such costs shall
be borne by the parties to the Rome Statute and those States that wish to contribute
voluntarily'.
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that trials can produce extraordinary results have been tempered by a more
mature appreciation of the complexity of doing justice in the wake of mass
atrocities, even as many states' commitment to core values of justice have
deepened. When it comes to the extraordinary engagement of the ICC, the
challenge today is to harness its potential contributions without placing too
great a burden of expectation on its finite, if at times vital, role.

